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Origin of the constitution

1. On the I6th August, 1960, the republic of Cyprus was established as an “independent and sovereign republic” and its constitutions came into force .
That constitution was mainly based on the Agreement reached at Zurich on the Iith february, 1959, between the Greek and the Turkish Prime Ministers, whereby the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus was laid down and two draft Treaties, the Treaty of Guarantee and the treaty of Alliance between the Republic; of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were formulated, as later implemented by the Agreement reached in London on the 19th february, 1959, between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey and the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Community of Cyprus . Under the London Agreement certain measures were agreed for the new arrangements in Cyprus one of which was the immediate establishment of a Joint Commission in Cyprus composed of one representative each nominated by the Government of Greece and the Government of Turkey together with a legal adviser nominated by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey for the purpose of drafting a constitution for the independent Republic of Cyprus . The legal adviser so appointed was Professor marcel Bridel, of the University of Lausanne, assisted by Mr. louis Bagi, a lawyer from Lausanne.

Drafts of human rights

2. The Joint Constitutional Commission commenced officially its work on the 6th May, 1959, at a plenary session at which Professor Bridel was welcomed by the heads of the delegations. There were submitted two drafts for the constitution of Cyprus on behalf of the Greek and the Turkish delegations respectively and the matter was then referred to a preparatory sub-committee.
Both drafts contained a part relating to human rights. The Greek drafts was mainly based on the constitution of Greece which originated from the constitution of Turkey of the roth january 1945 and was rather following the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe made at Rome on the 4th November 1950. The human rights provided in such drafts were of the “classic type” or of the “old catalogue” and were referring to political and civil rights.

Social and economic rights

3. It was Professor Bridel who, by his proposed draft for the articles of the constitution on fundamental human rights, submitted to the preparatory sub-committee, raised the question of the inclusion of certain social or economic rights in the proposed constitution of Cyprus . The preparatory sub-committee at a series of meetings considered the draft of the part of the constitution relating to human rights and produced its first draft on the roth August 1959. That part together with the other parts of the constitution were considered at successive meetings of the preparatory sub-committee held in Cyprus and later at Lausanne, where the preparatory sub-committee adjourned its meetings, from the 18th january to 10th February, 1960. At those meetings the final draft relating to human rights was settled, the only question remaining outstanding being that relating to the right to marriage. That right, after protracted discussions of the delegations was finally settled and the present Article 22 of the constitution took its final from.

4. The draft prepared by the preparatory sub-committee in English was adopted by the Joint Constitutional Commission at its plenary session of the 6th April 1960 over which Professor Bridel presided and was then translated into Greek and Turkish, the two official languages of the Republic under the Zurich Agreement. The Greek and Turkish text thus prepared was declared to be the relevant text of the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus under the Republic of Cyprus Order-in-Council 1960 and was initialed by initialed by representations of the British, Greek and Turkish Governments and the two leaders of the Greek and Turkish Community in Cyprus in the early hours of the 16th August, 1960, when it was put into force .
Part II of the constitution is entitled “Fundamental Right and Liberties” and as already stated apart from the political and civil rights deals also with social, economic and cultural rights.

THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS

No right can pre-exists the state

1. Though by nature the man., the abstract human being stripped of all his relations, has been endowed at his birth by his creator with the give to live in freedom, to enjoy his belongings and to perpetuate his life in the person of his descendants, nevertheless we cannot speak about rights until after the formation of the society and the emergence of the state. A right, irrespective of whether it is a power of the will or a protected interest or a power of the will capable of protecting an interest , is always granted by law and presupposes the existence of the state.

Nature and origin of human rights

2. But, as rightly pointed out, the law relating to human rights arises out of the nature of man and it is “rational, universal and fundamental as the expression of the highest reason of man”.
It is not my purpose to embark upon a detailed examination of the historical evolution of the law of human rights but the first constitutional documents whereby human rights were declared and recognized (i.e. the Manga Carta of 1215, the Petition of Rights of 1628 and the Bill of Rights of 1688 in England, the Virginaia Bill of Rights of 1776 the first constitution of Massachusetts of 1780 and the Declaration of Independence of 4th July 1776 in the United States of America and the French Declaration of 1789, 1793 and 1795) influenced by the political philosophy of the eighteenth century and the then prevailing liberal doctrines were aiming at the protection of the individual against oppression by the political authority. During a period of absolute monarchy the emerging new commercial, industrial and cultural middle class was feeling oppressed and exploited by the state represented by the ruling upper privileged class of the nobles and the clergy. It was against the state that protection was sought and for this reason political and civil rights were recognized to the individual to whom a sphere of free activity was left (liberte-autonomie) within the limits of which the state should either refrain from interfering in any way or was allowed to interfere very sparingly on certain exceptional occasions provided by law . According to this view liberty and authority are two opposing conception and liberty is a right belonging to the individual as against the state which he could resist by preventing any interference with his rights (liberte-resistance) . The duties of the state towards the individual consist in its abstention (nec facere) from any action which may affect his individual rights.

Transformation of conception of human rights

3. With the changed industrial, social technological and cultural conditions in the twentieth century and the development of new methods of production, consumption, credit and commercial relations, it was found that the classical individual civil and political rights could not satisfy the needs of the man, in the modern society. What was the use of having the inviolability of his home protected, if he could not have a decent home to live in or of guaranteeing the freedom of expressing his thoughts if having to work since childhood had not the means nor the time to receive instruction and education enabling him to formulate properly his thoughts or of securiting the freedom of movement if he had no other place to go to?
For this reason, in the twentieth century the conception of human rights has undergone a radical transformation in three main respects.

(a) their domain has been expanded so as to include apart from the classic human civil and political rights, economic and social rights as well .
> The propose of social rights is not only to protect the individual vis-a-vis the state but also to assist him to develop effectively his personality by the creation of conditions and the discharge of services enabling him to overcome oppression from other social forces.
In his message to the Congress of the 6th january, 1941, President Roosevelt in connection with the aims of the war formulated the four freedoms “freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom fear” . The last two freedoms disclose conciselt the aim of social rights as tending to liberate the man from all the economic oppression and to secure him from isolation, insecurity and economic dependence .
The social rights are not opposed to the classic political and civil rights but on the contrary they expand and implement them by affording to the individual the means and opportunity to exercise and enjoy such rights;
(b) Their juridical conception has been changed from a right to claim an abstention by state to a right to require some positive action. In the epigrammatic observation of Professor Burdeau:
Tandis que les droits individuels, au sens traditionnel, sont des pouvoirs d’interdire, les droits sociaux sont des pouvoirs d’exiger .
In the daily life various from of constraints, pressures and abuses emanate not only from the state but also from various other quarters such as big enterprises in the factory, the workshop, the office and other large groups and must be guarded against. The individual invokes then the protection of the state which by a positive action has to intervene for the safeguard of his rights not only on the public law ashere but also in connection with private law relations . Most of such rights should be exercised for the public benefit, the individual having a duty towards the society and the individual rights being transformed to social functions .
(c) whilst the classic human right belonged to the individual and its enforcement rested with him, the state authorizing and protecting its exercise, the social and economic rights belong rather to a class and become collective rights belonging to all the members of the class. In this way there is a socialisation de la liberte, the individual right becoming a recognized social function organized for the benefit of the community.

Constitutional provisions relating to social rights

Although for the first time a provision was made for certain social rights in the French Declaration of the 24th June 1793 nevertheless chronologically it was the constitution of Weimar of the 11th August 1919 which incorporated these new trends in a systematic way and opened the series of new declarations of human rights followed by other European constitutions in the period between the two world wars .
Most of the post-war constitutions contain declarations of human and social rights . They contain also provision about the duties of the citizen (mainly relating to taxing obligations, obligation to serve in certain services without any remuneration, obligation of partners to maintain their children and the disposal of one’s natural and intellectual capacities for the benefit of the society) and other social provisions referring to the economic life, the property, the work, the family and the cultural life.

Internationalization of human rights

4. The human rights, however, have not remained within the province of the domestic jurisdiction of the states but have not entered the international plane and have been internationalized. Although international law is a law regulating the rights and duties of the states inter se and the individual human being is not directly a subject of international law, nevertheless even in the past the protection of some of his fundamental rights on humanitarian grounds was invoked in state practice as a ground for intervention and now with the creation of new international organizations in the words of de la Pradelle: le moment est venu, pour l’homme ecartant l’Etat, de monter avec des institutions nouvelles au premier pang de la vie internationale .
The internationalization of human rights started after the end of the First World War with the establishment of the League of Nations, when the rigidity of the conception of sovereignty was relaxed and the need for the protection of minorities contributed to bringing forward the international protection of human rights . Certain individual freedoms and social rights of the workmen and generally of employed people were recognized and put under the protection of international organizations such as the International Labour Organizations and the International Labour Office .
After the Second World War the internationalization of human rights was extended . The important steps towards this direction were taken by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with its Protocols of the Council of Europe and the European Social Charter .
Recently on the 16th December 1966 the general Assembly of the United Nations adopted unanimously the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and by 66 votes to 2 with 38 abstentions the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . All those documents have been opened for signature since the 19th December, 1966. The Republic of Cyprus was amongst the six first countries (that is to say Costa Rica, Cyprus, Honduras, Israel, Jamaica and Philippines) which signed the aforesaid documents.

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW OF CYPRUS

Constitution aims at welfare state

1. The constitution of the Republic of Cyprus by a series of Articles guarantees to the individual certain social and economic rights which are to be exercised within the framework of public interest and common good.
Without adhering to a particular economic or social system a fair balance is maintained between the individualistic liberal theories of the laisser-faire state of the last century and the social trends of the twentieth century. Though the private initiative and free economy are declared and adhered to nevertheless the private enterprise is checked by state intervention when public interest and benefit so require. The functions and the role of the state contemplated by the constitution are those of the “welfare state” .

Right to decent existence and social security

2. Article 9 of the Constitution provides that:
Every person has the right to a decent existence and to social security. A law shall provide for the protection of the workers, assistance to the poor and for a system of social insurance.
By this Article two rights are guaranteed – a right to decent existence and a right to social security.
What is a “decent existence” in not provided in the Article but from its whole tenor it appears that the state has an obligation to create an maintain such conditions of living of work and of health as to enable every person to enjoy a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family.
The right to social security on the other hand tends to protect the individual in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. The Second limb of the Article, whereby means of securing and enforcing the right guaranteed under its first limb are provided, may be used in aid of interpretation of the letter. The state has a constitutional duty to enact a law for the protection of the workers, assistance to the poor and for a system of a social insurance.
A question has arisen as to whether the provisions, of that Article relate only to a legislative programme containing directives to the legislature or whether they are substantive constitutional law creating obligations for the legislature and rights for the individual .
From the wording of this Article coupled with the provisions of Article 35 under which “the legislative, executive and juridical authorities of the Republic shall be bound to secure, within the limits of their respective competence, the efficient provisions of this Part” it follows that Article 9 contains substantive constitutional rules and that there exists a command and not merely a directive to the legislature .
Actually laws for the protection of the workers were in existence on the date of coming into force of the constitution and were saved by its Article 188 . Certain laws protecting the workers were enacted after the establishment of the Republic .
After the establishment of the Republic labor legislation for the protection of the workers was enacted and the Republic acceded to many international labor conventions which having been approved by law and published in the official gazette of the Republic have, under Article 169 of the constitution, superior force to any municipal law.
There were also certain labor conventions which being applicable to the Colony of Cyprus on independence day continue to apply in the Republic under the provisions of Article 8 of the Treaty of Establishment (the inheritance Clause).
With regard to social insurance the Social Insurance law, 1964 was enacted.

Freedom to work and of trade and business

3. Every person has the right to practice any profession or to carry any trade or business . No person shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor.
In the laissez faire state the principle of free enterprise was prevailing and the individual was at liberty to choose his own profession or exercise any business without being bound to belong to any corporation or to have franchise or grant from government .
But the exercise of such could not be absolute as the state has a power to regulate it for the protection of the rights of others or of the community at large. The existence of the state itself and requirements of good government presuppose such regulation.
The power of regulation is expressly and restrictively provided in the constitution of Cyprus and is not to be inferred from the general police power of the state as elsewhere and consists in prescribing formalities, conditions or restrictions for the exercise of this right.
Such formalities, conditions or restrictions should however, be provided by law and should relate regarding a profession exclusively to the qualifications usually required for the exercise of such profession or necessary only in the interests of the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the constitution to any person or in the public interest.
Even before the establishment of the Republic the state was intervening in the economic sphere and regulating certain commercial and other business activities in the public interest. Such intervention has been expanded since the establishment of the Republic on grounds of public interest.
A five years economic plan was made in respect of the years 1962 to 1966 which was essentially a public investment programme. It was implemented by the Development Budget of each year to which it related and was carried out. A second five year plan is in the course of preparation. Such planification is not inconsistent with the free economy contemplated by the constitution.
As an exception to the freedoms of work, to the freedoms of work, trade and business guaranteed under Article 25 of the constitution a law may provide if it is in the public interest, that certain enterprises of the nature of an essential public service or relating to the exploitation of sources of energy or other natural resources shall be carried out exclusively by the Republic or a municipal corporation or by a public corporate body created for the purpose by such law and administered under the control of the Republic and having a capital which may be derived from public and private funds or from either such source only.
By this constitutional provision power is given to the state to create a state monopoly subject to the following conditions:

(a) such monopoly should be created by law;
(b) in the public interest;
(c) only with regard to enterprises constituting an essential public service or relating to the exploitation of sources of energy or other natural resources and
(d) be carries out exclusively by the state or a municipal corporation or a public corporation created ad hoc by such law.

The public corporation is a new type of public institution created for the purposes of “overcoming the antithesis of government and business … It is clothed with the power of government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of private enterprise”.
Such corporation should be administered under the control of the Republic.
The creation of the state monopoly contemplated by Article 25 (3) of the constitution is not a from of nationalization as no individual property (in any from) is transferred to the state. No question of compensation, therefore, arises. Nevertheless by the proviso to paragraph 3 or Article 23 it is provided that “where the enterprise was carried out by any person, other than a municipal corporation or a public corporate body, the installations used for such enterprise shall at the request of such person be acquired on payment of a just price by the public corporate body concerned.

Freedom to contract

4. Closely connected with the right to work and the freedom of trade and business and one of the means for their effectuation is the freedom to contract, guaranteed under Article 26 of the constitution which reads as follows:

Every person has the right to enter freely into any contract subject to such conditions, limitations or restrictions as are laid down by the general principles of the law of contract. A ;law shall provide for the prevention of exploitation by persons who are commanding economic power.
It is to be observed that what is protected under this Article is the right to enter into a contract and not the obligations arising aou of an agreement resulting from an exercise of that right as under Article 1 Section 10 paragraph 1 of the constitution of the United States. Rights arising out of a contract are not fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution of Cyprus. It is competent, therefore for the state by legislation to alter the terms and conditions of a contract in the public interest. Thus a law for the protection of distressed tenants was not found to be unconstitutional. Also reference may be made inter alia to the Interest law (Cap 150) fixing the maximum rate of interest at 9% to the Ursury (Framers) Law (Cap 101); the Rent (Control) Law (Cap 86); the rent Control (Business Premises) Law 1961, the Commodities and Services (Regulations and Control) Law, 1962; the Agricultural Farmers Relief Law, 1962.
But even in the United State where not only the right to contract is guaranteed but any interference with the obligations of a contract by state legislation is precluded is was found that the states retain a protective power of control exercised in a manner otherwise appropriate in the regulation of business.
But even the exercise of the right to contract under the constitution of Cyprus is not absolute but it is “subject to such conditions, limitations or restriction as are laid down by the general principles of the law of contract”. The existence of a contract is determined by such principles. It is essential, therefore, that the parties to the contract should have the necessary legal capacity, that there should be a consensus ad idem and that the contract should not be void for any reason whatsoever including that of illegality.
The freedom to contract implies that the parties are standing on an equal basis because as observed by Friedmann “the concept of freedom and equality in contract are interchangeable”. For this purpose and in order to restore equality between the parties, which owing to prevailing economic conditions may have been disturbed, the constitution provides that the exploitation by persons who are commanding economic power should be prevented by law. As observed by Chief Justice Hughes in West Coast Hostel v. Parrish (81 Law ed. p. 701):
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well being but costs a direct burden for their support upon the community. That these workers lose on wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay.
In this respect reference may by made to the aforementioned labor legislation and also to the recently enacted Annual Leaves with Payment Law 1967 and the Termination of Employment Law 1967.
It is observed that the freedom to contract is guaranteed to the individual against interference by the state and where any limitation or restriction is made not in the interest of the state or any public body but for the purpose of regulation of civil law rights any such interference is not unconstitutional.
Finally by paragraph 2 of Article 26 it is provided that a law may provide for collective labor contracts of obligatory fulfillment by employers and workers with adequate protection of the rights of any person whether or not represented at the conclusion of such contract.
By that provision the legal nature of a collective agreement is determined. A collective agreement creates norms binding the employers and workmen who become parties to individual contracts of employment amde thereunder or in consequence of such agreement although not represented at its conclusion.
Collective bargaining in the modern society aims establishing equality in the bargaining power of the parties and marks the exercise of public law function through private groups and in private law matters.

Freedom to from and join trade unions

5. Apart from the general freedom of association the constitution of Cyprus, like some other constitutions, guarantees specifically the freedom of forming and joining a trade union (liberte syndicale). Even before the establishment of the Republic trade unions were recognized by law and were functioning in Cyprus.
Under the law of Cyprus a trade union is a combination whether temporary or permanent of the relations between workmen and employers or between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employers and includes a federation of trade unions the members of which are engaged in the same or similar trade or calling. The constitutional guarantee extends also to any federation or confederation or trade unions.
The constitution guarantees both the positive freedom of every person to from and join a trade union of this choice and the negative freedom of every person not to join or to continue to be a member of a trade union. This is in line with the prevailing trend in Europe where “compulsory trade unionism” is not favored.
It follows that any provision in any collective labor agreement whereby the “general organization clause” to the effect that the employer shall employ workers belonging to a trade union or the “restricted organization clause” whereby the employer shall employ workers belonging to the trade union with which the collective labor agreement was made in void as contrary to the freedom guaranteed under the constitution.
Furthermore by section 50 of the Trade Unions Law 1965 it is expressly provided that it shall not be lawful to make the employment of a workman subject to the condition that he shall not join or shall relinquish trade union membership or to cause the dismissal or otherwise prejudice a workmen by reason of trade union membership or because of participation in trade union activities outside working hours. Of course the freedom of the employer to engage a workman of his choice, irrespective of whether such workman is or is not a member of trade union, remains unrestricted.

Right to strike

6. The constitution of Cyprus recognizes the right to strike. Article 27 reads as follows:
The right to strike is recognized and its exercise may be regulated by law for the purposes of safeguarding the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public order or the public safety or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the inhabitants or the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the constitution to any person.
It follows then the constitutional recognition of strikes as a fundamental right precludes the legislature from undermining it by way of regulation of its exercise. As Professor Burdeau says: reglementer n’est pas supprimer. A law cannot render punishable the exercise of such right nor hinder it either directly or indirectly by providing prejudicial consequences of a civil nature against the strikers. The regulation by law should be made for the reasons which are restrictively provided in the aforecited Article 27 and which cannot be expanded but shall be interpreted strictly (Article 33).
There is not definition of “strike” but that expression should be given the meaning accepted by the courts as a simultaneous, concerted and collective cessation of work for the purpose of supporting claims relating to condituons of work. The aim of a strike presupposes the relation of employer and employee and its aim should have an economic character. So it seems that political strikes are not guaranteed by the constitution.
The general recognition of the right to strike under paragraph 1 of Article 27 of the constitution is qualified, however, with respect to members of the armed forces and the police and the public service.
Paragraph 2 reads as follows:

The members of the armed forces, of the police and of the gendarmerie shall not have the right to strike. A law may extend such prohibition to the members of the public service.

The strike of members of the armed forces and the police aiming at compelling the state to accept more favorable conditions of service is considered as inconsistent with their status and the nature of the service which should continue to be exercised unhampered for the attainment of state purposes. Though similar considerations may apply to the members of the public service nevertheless the constitutional provision is an enabling one. A law was recently enacted about the public service but contains no prohibition of strikes by public officers.
There is an apparent inconsistency between the above paragraph 2 of Article 27 of the constitution and paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the United Nations which, as already stated, the Republic signed though not yet approved by a law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Covenant reads as follows:
This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the state.
The constitution denies the existence of such to members of the armed forces and the police whilst the Covenant presupposes the existence of such right and confers only power of imposing lawful restrictions on the exercise of the right.
But as pointed out by Basu “restriction does not exclude the idea of prohibition everything being a question of degree”. As observed also by the Privy Council “regulation may clearly take the from of denying certain activities to persons who by age or circumstances are unfit to perform them … Here again a question of fact and degree is involved”.
So long as the strike means the simultaneous cessation of work and presupposes the existence of relationship between employer and employee and of “a trade dispute” it can hardly be alleged that it may be resorted to by members of the armed forces of the state.
So in spite of an apparent inconsistency between the two texts in substance no differentiation exists.

REMEDIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS

Constitutional remedies

1. Mere declaration of economic and social rights without any provision for their enforcement would be purposeless. For this reason the constitution of Cyprus not only defines the rights in clear language but provides also affective remedies for their enforcement.
The legislative executive remedies and judicial authorities of the Republic shall be bound to secure within the limits of their respective competence the efficient application of the provisions relating to fundamental rights and liberties.
Where a positive legislative action is required to be taken the legislature has a constitutional duty to take such and enact the law required. On the other hand if the provision of any law is in any way contrary to or inconsistent with the constitutional provisions such law may, on the question being by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional when it become inapplicable to such proceeding. Any such decision of the Supreme Court is binding on all courts, organs, authorities and persons in the Republic.
If the fundamental rights of a person are violated by any administrative act or omission that person amy apply to the administrative authority for redress under Article 29 of the constitution and if he does not get satisfaction he may have recourse to the Supreme Court for the annulment of such act or omission as being contrary to the provisions of the constitution or of any law or is made in excess or abuse of powers and the Supreme Court may declare such act as null and void and no effect whatsoever or declare the such omission ought not to have been made and that whatever has been omitted should have been performed. Furthermore the person aggrieved may resort to the Supreme Court for any of the Prerogative orders of mandamus or quo warranto.
If a person is aggrieved by a judicial act he may appeal to the Supreme Court and further he may apply for an order of certiorari or prohibition.

International protection

2. The Republic of Cyprus has already signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United nations and the European Social Charter of the Council of Europe. It is hoped that very soon they will be approved by a Law and thus have the force of law, superior to any municipal law (Article 169 (3) of the constitution).
The protection of the social and economic rights will thus now be brought on the international sphere. And though there is no provision for a recourse to an international body in connection with any grievance organizations will be interested in the way Cyprus is protecting such rights and informed about the situation.

As observed by Paton the term “property” has “a bewildering variety of uses”. It may reflect the legal relationship of a person to a particular object in the sense of a right of ownership or title or it may be related to the subject matter or such right itself.
In other respects the expression “property” may be used in its widest sense including all of a person’s legal rights of whatever description, what the Romans called a “universitas rerum” and the Greeks “periousia”.

The classical from of the right of property comprised a power to possess and use the object of property, to enjoy it and to destroy it, which in the Roman law was expressed as “jus utendi. jus fruendi and jus abutendi” although certain restrictions were put to the last one. This right was considered as one of the natural rights brought by man at his birth, which could not in any way be interfered with except in certain restricted cases specifically provided by law.
That was the concept permeating the various declarations and constitutions during the French revolution.
“Les hommes naissent at demeurent libres et egaux en droit …. Les droits sont … la propriete.”
declared art. 1 et 2 of the declaration de droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789 and repeated all subsequent declarations and constitutions. In this respect the provision of article 8 of the Declaration of 1793 is noteworthy.
“La surete consiste dans la protection accordee par la societe a chacun des ses members par la conservation de sa personne, de ses droits et de sa propriete.”

The Code Civil on the other hand in its article 544 defines the right of property on similar lines.

“La propriete est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la maniere la plus absolute, pourvu qu’ on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibe par la loi et les reglements.”

In the United States of America the right to private property under the influence of Locke was recognized as a natural individual right by the various Bills of Rights and the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
This individualistic approach, however, to the right of property has changed to-day. The right of property instead of being considered as a natural individual right inviolable, sacrosanct and imprescriptible, which every individual brings with him at birth, is looked upon as a social function imposing obligations also on the individual for the benefit of the society of which he is a member.
The right of property, under this new concept, is created and regulated by law for the social benefit and expresses a relationship not between individuals and things but between the individuals themselves. This new concept was declared by many constitutional texts after the First World War.
Reference may be made to article 153 of the constitution of Weimar, repeated in article 14 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is as follows:

“(1) The rights of ownership and of inheritance are guaranteed. Their contents and limits shall be determined by the laws.
(2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal”

“Also the constitution of France of 1949 in its preamble after reaffirming the rights and freedoms of man and citizen consecrated by the Declaration of Rights of 1789 proclaims that”
“All property and all enterprises that now have or subsequently shall have the character of a national public service or a monopoly in fact must become the property of the community.”

By the preamble to the constitution of France of 1958 to 1963 the attachment of the French people to the Rights of Man and the principles of national sovereignty, reaffirmed and complemented by the preamble of the constitution of 1946, was proclaimed.
The new concept of property, amounting to a social function imposing obligations, was adopted by many post Second War constitutions.

2. But even when the right of property was considered as a natural inviolable and imprescriptible right it had to yield, on certain occasions, to the right of the community at large when public interest so required.
The Declaration if Rights of 1789 itself in article 17 proclaimed that -
“La propriete etant un droit inviolable et sacre, nul ne peut en etre prive, si ce n’est lorsque la necessite publique, legalement constatee, l’exige et sous la condition d’une juste et prealable indemnite.”

Even before that the Great Charter of 1215 in England by its 29th Chapter guaranteed that “no free man shall be … disseize of his freeholds or liberties or free customs … but by the law of the land.”
Also by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution it was provided that -
“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

The power of expropriation, as it was called, has been granted since by almost every constitution.
Such power is inherent in the sovereignty of every state which is entitled to exercise supreme authority over all persons and things within its territory. This includes the right to take to itself any property within its territory applying the principle of “eminent domain”, as it is called in the United States of America, which is the proprietary aspect of sovereignty and is inseparable from it.
As the Supreme Court of India put it in the case of Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India (A 1951 SC 41 (54) Mulkerjea J) -
“It is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate private property belonging to individual citizens for public use. The right which is described as eminent domain in American law, is like the power of taxation, an offspring of political necessity, and it is supposed to be based upon an implied reservation by Government that private property acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken or its use controlled for public benefit irrespective of the wishes of the owner.”

The right to expropriate has been recognized in diplomatic practice and by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1962 (Resolution 1803 (XVII) and reaffirmed on November 25, 1966, though always coupled with the requirement for compensation.

3. Another method of compulsory taking of private property by the State is confiscation. Confiscation differs from expropriation in that no compensation is paid for the taking of property.
Confiscation, or as the English terminology prefers forfeiture, is punishment, presupposes conviction of a criminal offence and is usually limited to the loss of the instruments or products sceleris. So long as confiscation, being a from of punishment, cannot be effected except in judicial proceedings it follows then even the legislature should not impose confiscation though at various at ages of history examples of such confiscation may come across. But the Fundamental law of civilized countries prohibits now such a course. It is significant that the Constitution of Cyprus by its Article 12.6 prohibits the general confiscation of property as a punishment.
A rule of customary international law prohibiting confiscation of property on territory occupied by a belligerent appears to have developed recently.
Sometimes, however, it happens that property is transferred to the State by indirect means for, instance through the imposition of confiscating taxes as in the case of Corn Products Refining Company.

4. Finally “nationalization” is another method of taking private property by the State in the exercise of its territorial sovereignly.
> Regarding terminology the expression “nationalization” though not unknown towards the end of the nineteenth century nevertheless it was after the Second Word War that it was made frequent use of when the various States took extensive nationalization measures.
But as pointed out by O’Connell -
“the term “nationalization” is not one of art; hence as such it has no place in the language of international law. It is popularly employed to describe the process whereby certain industries or means of production, distribution or exchange are, in pursuance of social or economic politics, concentrated in public hands”.

The Institute de Droit International defined nationalization, to the same effect, as follows: -
“La nationalisation est le transfert a l’Etat par measure legislative et dans un interet public, de biens de droit prives d’une certaine categorie, en vue de leur exploration ou controle par l’Etat ou d’une nouvelle destination qui leur seriat donnee par celui-ci”.

It follows from the above decision that the motives for nationalization, whether political, economical, financial or social, are immaterial.
Nationalization may be distinguished from expropriation in two respects -
a)regarding the duration of the process of transfer. Whilst an expropriation law is a piece of permanent legislation enabling it to be invoked on every occasion of expropriation and providing for the machinery to be used in such case a nationalization legislation usually provides a process which is to be put into operation only once and aim at the transfer of the enterprise to be State or State controlled body by operation of law.
b)expropriation usually relates to particular property whilst nationalization is made for an enterprise in general or the whole of proprietary (universitas rerum) and other rights and obligations.

As Vedel says -
” La nationalisation porte sur un ensemble de biens, de droits et d’obligations, sur une universalite. Les expropriation ordinaries, on le sait, portent au contraire sur des biens individualisees et ne comportent pas a la charge de l’expropriant un passif (sauf les indemnites aux creanciers hypothecaires). L’expropriation porte au contraire sur un ensemble, sur l’universalite des biens devolus a la nouvelle enterprise nationale et, par consequent, par le probleme du reglement du passif”.

1. The right of property in Cyprus is guaranteed by Article 23 of its Constitution, paragraph 1 of which is as follows:-
“Every person alone or jointly with others has the right to acquire, possess, enjoy or dispose of any movable or immovable property and has the right to respect for such right.
The right of the Republic to underground water, minerals and antiquities is reserved.”

The Constitution itself does not define the right guaranteed under that paragraph but as pointed out by the Supreme Constitutional Court in Evlogimenos v. The Republic 2 RSCC p. 142 -
“Further the Court in examining the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitutions has proceeded on the well-settled principle that the right to property safeguarded by an Article such as this is not a right in abstracto but a right as defined and regulated by the law relating to civil law rights to property and the word “property” in paragraph 1 of Article 23 has to be understood and interpreted in this sense.”

This is in accordance with the principles adopted by other constitutions. The constitution of Japan of 1946 for instance specifically provides in article 29 that -
“the right to own or to old hold property is inviolable, but property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with public welfare”

So a guidance is given to the legislator as to criteria to be adopted in respect of the definition of the right to property.
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany on the other hand in article 14 (1) provides that “the contents and limits” of the property and the right of inheritance “shall be determined by the laws” without in any way preceding the extent or manner of such determination.
Some other constitutions contain more precise definition of the right to property and leave to the legislator to regulate the exercise of that right in accordance with certain principles expressly provided by the constitution. In this respect reference may be to article 43 of the constitution of Eire, a unique feature of which is the recognition of the right to “private ownership of external goods” as a natural right “antecedent to positive law”, whereby a power is acknowledged to the state” as occasion requires” to “delimit by law” the exercise of the rights guaranteed by that article “with a view of reconciling their exercise with the exigencies of the common good”.

Finally under the provisions of other constitutions, especially those of the Eastern block, the constitutional protection varies in accordance with the mode of acquisition of the property.
But though the Constitution of Cyprus does not define itself the right guaranteed under paragraph 1 of Article 23 nevertheless on a proper construction of that paragraph it appears -
(a) that the property protected thereunder should be either movable or immovable property. No definition is given in the Constitution of either of those expressions but on the well-known principles of construction the constitutional legislator must be taken to have known the meaning of those expressions in the legal system of Cyprus immediately before the coming into operation of the Constitution and to have used them with that meaning.
(b) the movable or immovable property protected thereby should be capable of being acquired, owned, enjoyed or disposed of,
(c) If the law does not recognize any right on any such property there could be no protection under that Article,
(d) the right should be defined in the law in such a way as to render the guarantee provided by the Constitution operative and not to frustrate the constitutional protection by under restriction of the contents or extent of the right.
Of course it would be better had the Constitution by express provision indicated what kind of property and to what extent it was intended to protect it. And in this respect the preparatory works of Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be of interest.

2. No deprivation or restriction or limitation of any right guaranteed under paragraph 1 of Article 23 shall be made except as provided in Article 23 (ibit paragraph 2).
We are not concerned in this paper about the restrictions or limitations of such right for which specific provision is made in paragraph 3 of that Article. But with regard to deprivation apart from the cases specifically provided in paragraph 7 no such deprivation can be made save in case of compulsory acquisition of property.

3. Compulsory acquisition or movable or immovable property may be effected under the following conditions:
(1) The acquiring authority should be -

(a) the Republic; or
(b) a municipal corporation; or
(c) a Communal Chamber for the educational, religious. charitable or sporting institutions, bodies or establishments within its competence and only for the persons belonging to its respective Community; or
(d) a public corporation or a public utility body on which such right has been conferred by law.

(2) The acquisition should be made for a purpose which is to the public benefit and shall be specially provided by a general law for compulsory acquisition which shall be enacted within a year from the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution (the 16th August 1960);
(3) Such purpose should be established by a decision of the acquiring authority and made under the provisions of such law stating clearly the reason for such acquisition; and
(4) Upon the payment in cash and in advance of a just and equitable compensation to be determined in case of disagreement by a civil court.

4. It follows from the above constitutional provisions that -
(a) the acquiring cannot be any person other than the State or the public bodies respectively provided in the Constitution, to which the acquiring power is given expressly by law;
(b) no compulsory acquisition can be made unless the property to be acquired shall be vested in the acquiring authority. The acquired authority cannot compulsorily acquire property in the case expressly provided in the Constitution.
Such case is provided by paragraph 6 of Article 23 in the event of agricultural reform when land compulsorily acquired may be distributed from the purpose of such reform only to persons belonging to the same Community as the owner of the acquired property;
(c) the purpose for which the acquisition shall be made should be a purpose to the public benefit and shall be specially provided by a general law for compulsory acquisition.
Such law was enacted in 1962, the Compulsory Acquisition Law of that year, which though enacted after the time limit provided in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 4 of Article 23 of the Constitution was found be the Supreme Constitutional Court not to be unconstitutional because the provision as to tome were in the nature of directives to the legislature and, definitely, did not preclude subsequent compliance, the legislature being not entitled but bound to comply there with even after expiration of the time limit.
In section 3 (2) of that Law the particular purposes to the public benefit for which property may be compulsorily acquired are specified.
So long as the Constitution leaves to the legislator to specify the purposes to the public benefit for which a compulsory acquisition can be made it would not be necessary in each particular case to determine either by legislative or administrative action as elsewhere whether the proposed purpose is to the public benefit if it comes within the legislative ambit.
(d) if the purpose is one of the specified in the relevant Law then in each concrete case it has to be established by a decision of the acquiring authority that such purpose exists. In such decisions the reasons for the proposed acquisition should be clearly stated.
In the case of Chrysokhou Brothers v. Cyta (1966) J.S.C. p. 671 seq., it was found that no such decision for the compulsory acquisition was validly taken and the whole proceedings for compulsory acquisition were therefore a nullity;
(e) the machinery laid down in the afore cited Law should be followed in order to effect the acquisition.
For this purpose an order of acquisition would be necessary to be made by the acquiring authority. But were such authority is a public corporation or a public utility body no order of acquisition shall be made by such utility body no order of acquisition shall be made by such acquiring authority without the sanction of the Council of Ministers previously obtained (section 6 (3) of the Law);
(f) no acquisition shall be made except upon payment of a just and equitable compensation to be determined in case of disagreement by a civil court.
The matter of “just and equitable” compensation came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in the case of Moti and another v. The Republic (1968) J.S.C. at p. 285.
It was found in that case such compensation means the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken and included also compensation for the loss arising directly out of the delay in the sanctioning of the acquisition.
Such compensation shall be paid in cash. Very few constitutions provide for a cash payment of compensation as payment of compensation may be made either in kind or by exchange with other property. In Cyprus, save for the consent of the owner, no compensation otherwise that in cash can be paid.
The compensation shall also be paid in advance that is to say before the completion of the acquisition. From the way paragraph 4 of Article is worded (“……………….. any movable or immovable property or any right over or interest in such payment should be made only before the acquisition of the ownership but also before taking possession of the property.
Finally, such compensation has to be determined in case of disagreement by a civil court. The Constitution of Cyprus thus leaves the determination of the legislative or administrative authorities. But of course there is nothing preventing the legislature to provide for the general principles according to which compensation is to be assessed. Such principles are now contained in section 10 of the Compulsory Acquisition Law, 1962, which reproduce, with some modifications, the rules for the assessment of compensation in section 2 of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919;
(g) any king of movable or immovable property of any description may be the subject of compulsory acquisition.
Though there is no definition of movable or immovable property in the Constitution the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962, in section 2 (1) defines immovable property by reference to section 2 of the Immovable Property (tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law (Cap. 224) and movable property as a tangible property of every description except immovable property and as including any right or interest in any such property.
So it os not only corporeal property which is subject to compulsory acquisition but also any right or interest of a proprietary nature over any such property.
The Constitution of Cyprus does not protect constitutional rights as the constitution of the United States of America which by its Article I Section 10 Paragraph 1 prohibits the passing of any Law by a State “impairing the Obligation of Contracts”.
It is to be noted that under the Constitution of Cyprus movables may be compulsory acquired whilst under certain constitutions of some other countries only immovable property may be so acquired.

5. No movable or immovable property belonging to any See, monastery, church or any other ecclesiastical corporation, including any right over it or interest therein, and no vakf immovable property, including the objects and subjects of the vakfs and properties belonging to any Mosque or other Moslem religious institutions, can be compulsorily acquired except with the written consent of the appropriate ecclesiastical authority being in control of such property or with the approval of the Turkish Communal Chamber, respectively (paragraph 9 and 10 of Article 23).

6. Any immovable property or any right over or interest in any such property compulsorily acquired shall only be used for the purpose for which it has been acquired. If within three years of the acquisition such purpose has not been attained the acquiring authority shall, immediately after the expiration of the said period of three years, offer the property at the price it has been acquired to the person from whom it has been acquired. Such person shall be entitled within three months of the offer, and if he signifies acceptance, such property shall be returned to him immediately after his returning such price within a further period of three months from such acceptance (paragraph 5 of Article 23).

7. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus differentiates between the compulsory acquisition of property and the requisition of property (with which it deals in paragraph 8 of Article 23).
Under that paragraph any movable or immovable property may be requisitioned by the Republic or by a Communal Chamber for the purposes of the educations within its competence and only where the owner or the person entitled to possession of such property belongs to the respective Community. A requisition may be made for the same reasons and under the same conditions as a compulsory acquisition, except that the requisition cannot exceed three years and the compensation to be paid need not be paid in advance but promptly.
By virtue of paragraph 8 (a) of Article 23 the Requisition of Property Law, 1962, was passed. By its section 3 (2) the same purposes to the public benefit are specified as those for the compulsory acquisition.
A requisition differs from an acquisition of property in that under a requisition order only possession of the property is taken, the ownership remaining in the owner, whilst under an acquisition order the ownership is transferred. Furthermore, the compensation need not be paid in advance but promptly. Finally, a public corporation or a public utility body is not included amongst the requisitioning authorities.

8. The right of property is guaranteed by Article 23 of the Constitution not only to citizens but to every persons, including aliens.
Of course under Article 32 of the Constitution the Republic is not precluded from regulating by law this matter differently for aliens but no such regulation has been made so far and even if made it has to be in accordance with International Law.
In such a case the alien would be entitled to the international minimum standards under which the confiscation of foreign property is prohibited and the alien-owner is entitled to compensation though not at the same level as that on which compensation is awarded to citizens. Then be could have no legitimate ground of complaint because the treatment he receives is inferior to that which he would have received under his national law. When an alien acquires property in a foreign country he must be aware of the special constitutes under which he is to hold that property.

9. A compulsory acquisition should not be ordered if its object can be achieved in any less onerous manner; and it should be only resorted to if it is absolutely necessary to do so after exhausting the alternative possibility of achieving its object by means of purchasing other suitable property which is voluntarily offered by the owner. And before resorting to compulsory acquisition of a particular immovable property it should be considered whether there exists any other such property the acquisition of which will entail a deprivation on less onerous terms than the deprivation entailed in the proposed acquisition.

1. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus does not contain any provision relating to nationalization like the constitutions of some other countries.
2. Under paragraph 3 of Article 25 of the Constitution of Cyprus, however, and as an exception to the freedoms of work, trade and business guaranteed under paragraph 1 of that Article a law may provide, if it is in the public interest, that certain enterprises of the nature of an essential public service or relating to the exploitation of sources of energy or other natural resources should be carried out exclusively by the Republic or a municipal corporation or by a public corporate body created for the purpose by such law and administered under the control of the Republic, and having a capital which may be derived from public and private funds or from either such course only.
By this constitutional provision power is given to the State to create a State monopoly subject to the following conditions:

(a) such monopoly should be created by law;
(b) in the public interest;
(c) only with regard to enterprises constituting an essential public service or relating to the exploitation of sources of energy or other natural resources; and
(d) be carried out exclusively by the State or a municipal corporation or a public corporation created ad hoc by such law.

The public corporation is a new type of public institution created for the purposes of “overcoming the antithesis of government and business …….. it is allotted with power of government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of private enterprise”.

3. The creation of the State monopoly contemplated by Article 25 (3) of the Constitution is not a from of nationalization as no individual property in any from is transferred to the State. No question of compensation, therefore, arises. Nevertheless by the proviso to paragraph 3 of Article 23 it is provided that “where the enterprise was carried out any person, other than a municipal corporation or a public corporate body; the installations used for such enterprise shall, at the request of such person, be acquired on payment of a just price by the public corporate body concerned”.
It is to be observer that acquisition of the installations is made at the request of their owner if such owner is not a municipal corporation or other public body and the payment to be made in such a case would be payment of just price and not a just compensation as in the case of compulsory acquisition. Furthermore such price would be restricted only to the installations acquired and shall not relate to the goodwill or any proprietary rights.

4. So long as the Constitution of Cyprus is silent about nationalization a question arises whether the Republic of Cyprus has power to nationalize an enterprise.

The answer should be in the affirmative.

The Republic of Cyprus under Article 1 of its Constitution is an independent and sovereign State. It has, therefore, power, by a law to nationalize property within its territory if none of the human rights and fundamental freedom guaranteed by its Constitution is interfered with and no property of an alien is taken without keeping the international minimum standards.

The right to property is also guaranteed in the Republic of Cyprus by Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention for the protection of Human Right and Fundamental Freedoms which is as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

That Protocol was accede to by the Republic under a decision of the Council of Ministers and was ratified by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (Ratification) Law, 1962, and having been published in the official gazette of the Republic constitutes a part of its law and under Article 169 (3) of its Constitution has superior force to any municipal law.

I may now conclude:

(a) the property guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus represents the individualistic concept of property. The right of property is an individual prerogative and not a social function imposing obligation towards the society’

(b) the privileges and rights of the Church and other religious corporations and the Vakf are preserved and property belonging to them cannot be compulsorily acquired except with the consent or approval of the authority or person having control of that property:

(c) the right of property is secured. No deprivation of this right can be effected except through the constitutional machinery of the compulsory acquisition of property and in compliance with the conditions and guarantees laid down in the Constitution.

Some of those conditions and especially the requirement of payment of compensation in advance and in cash (excluding payment by bonds, in kind or by exchange for other property) is a handicap to many development programs;

(d) exceptionally and when public interest so requires, a State monopoly may be created by law in respect of certain enterprises of the nature of an essential public service or relating to the exploitation of sources of energy or other natural resources. Such monopoly shall be carried out exclusively by the Republic or by a municipal corporation or by a public corporation created ad hoc by that Law and administered under the control of the Republic. The capital of that corporation may be derived either from public and private funds or from either such source. No compensation is payable in such case but if the owner of the installations is not a municipal corporation or a public body and so wishes the Republic, the municipal corporation or the public corporations concerned as the case may be, shall acquire such installations and pay their just price:

(e) the Constitution is silent about nationalization. But the Republic of Cyprus, being a sovereign State, has power in the exercise of its territorial sovereignty to nationalize any enterprise by law on condition that compliance is made with the constitutional provisions relating to the fundamental rights and liberties and, in case of property belonging to aliens, with the minimum international standards

In this second edition of this book another Part was added, Part XII, dealing with the evolution of the Cyprus intercommunal talks. To the already existing Appendices nine more were added, setting-out the various proposals made for the solution of the Cyprus problem and certain statements and observations in connection therewith.

The intercommunal talks which were recessed in June 1979 was not found possible to be reactivated until the time when these lines are being written in spite of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations in this respect and the persistent efforts of the Secretary-General Dr. Waldheim in this direction. lt is hoped that wiser thoughts will prevail and that the intercommunal talks will be resumed in an effort to give a fair and viable solution to the Cyprus problem and relieve its most suffering people from all its afflictions.

Nicosia, 2nd of April, 1980.

CRITON G. TORNARITIS

ABBREVIATIONS

IA.C. Appeal Cases
A.J.I.L. American Journal International Law
B.Y.I.L. British Yearbook International Law
C.L.R. Cyprus Law Reports
K.B. Kings Bench
P.C.I.J. Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice
Q.B. Queens Bench
R.I.A.A. Reports of International Arbitral Awards
R.S.C.C. Reports of the Supreme Constitutional Court
S.I. Statutory Instrument
S.R.O. Rev. 1904 Statutory Rules and Orders Revised 1904 (2nd edition)
S.R.O. Rev. 1948 Statutory Rules and Orders Revised 1948 (3rd edition)

SHORT GEOGRAPHICAL, GEOLOGICAL,
DEMOGRAPHIC AND HISTORICAL SURVEY

Cyprus, the third largest island, after Sicily and Sardinia, in the Mediterranean, lies at its eastern basin between lat. 300. 34′ and 350. 42′N. and long. 32o.16′ and 34o.6E. at the cross-road of routes from east to west and from north to south. Its greatest length from the coast of Paphos in the west to the Cape St. Andreas in the east is about 150 miles, its greatest breadth from Cape Kormakitis in the north to Cape Gata in the south is 60 miles and its whole area is 3,572 square miles (9,251 square kilometres) and is similar in size to that of Lebanon or of Norfolk and Suffolk combined in the United Kingdom or of Puerto Rico.

Cyprus is in close proximity to three continents.

The distances from the neighboring countries are 43 miles from Cape Anamur in Asia Minor to Cape Kormakitis, on the north of Cyprus, 76 miles from Cape St. Andreas in the east to Syria, 255 miles from Port Said to Limassol and 270 miles from Cape Akamas in the west to Rhodes.
Its shape has been described as oblong and parallel to the equator, like that of Crete, being the opposite of Rhodes, which is almost upright and vertical to the equators whilst another description represents Cyprus as having the shape of a wheel-barrow being pushed along, seen from the side. Its handles are represented by the long Karpass peninsula and the wheels by the Akrotiri peninsula.

The shape of Cyprus is determined by two parallel mountain ranges stretching from the west to the east. The northern range, the Kyrenia or Pendadaktylos range, with its very impressive jagged outline runs at a distance of a few miles from the coast for about sixty miles from above Vassilia-Lapithos on the west to Kantara castle on the east wherefrom it falls away along the Karpass peninsula, its highest peak being about 3,357 ft. at Kyparissovouno. The other range is that of Troodos to the south, the massif of which consists of very old rock its highest point, Chionistra, having a height of 6,403 ft. These mountains are mostly covered with forest trees mainly of the Aleppo pine and black pine and a variety of bushes. In the spring wild flowers of a variety of colors render the scenery more beautiful.

Between these two ranges lies the Messaoria plain (that is to say between the mountains) which has a breadth of 12 to 15 miles and extends from Morphou Bay, in the west, to the Famagusta Bay, in the east. The Messaoria plain is very fertile producing in most seasons fine crops of grain. But its cultivation depends almost entirely on the rainfall which usually occurs between the months of October and March but in years of drought the plain appears very arid.

Apart from those two mountain ranges there exist also an isolated mountain far to the east, the Stavrovouni, having a height of 2,258 feet from which on clear days Lebanon may be discernible.

From a geological point of view Cyprus is comparatively young dating back to about 150 million years. The oldest rocks are attributed to the Cretaceous of early Eocene period. They probably underlie the whole island. The Troodos mountain-range consists of igneous rocks (mainly plutonic, dyke and volcanic rocks) on top of which there is series of sedimentary rocks ranging from the Upper Cretaceous to the Pleistocene period. Regarding the Kyrenia range on the other hand its core consists mainly of highly tectonised metamorphosed limestones and dolomite forming blocks on top of the other.

It is considered that the structures found in the northern Cypriot range are typical of the Alpine orogenic movements. The conclusion, therefore, of Professor Alagoz that “1′île de Chypre, est physiquement dependante de la Turquie” owing to the similarity of the structure of the Taurus mountain in Asia Minor with the northern range of mountains in Cyprus does not seem to be well founded as it appears that such range is the most external part of the external zones of the Hellenic Alps which extend from New Yugoslavia, western Albania, western Greece, Peloponnesos Crete, Rhodes, Taurus and Amanus.

lt appear that geologically the island of Cyprus has been formed by the joining together of two small islands that of Troodos massif which appeared about 100 million years ago with that of Kyrenia which emerged later about 11 million years ago. These two islands became joined as the uplift continued thus forming the Messaoria plain.

Iron and copper pyrites are the principal minerals but there exist also chrome and asbestos as colored earth (terra-umbra).

The climate of Cyprus is mild in winter with plenty of sunshine and hot in the summer down in the plains though cool on the hills at about 40-50 miles away from the main towns. Its beautiful and variates scenery coupled with the temperance of its climate renders the island an ideal holiday centre and attracts great number of tourists all the year round, for whom now all modern. facilities are provided.

Cyprus is mainly an agricultural country and its wine and citrus fruit are exported to various countries. Its wine has been famous since ancient times and according to one version it was one of the reasons which contributed to the Turkish occupation of the island by Sultan Selim Il in 1571. Among the other goods exported from Cyprus are other agricultural products, such as fresh grapes, potatoes, carrots and other fresh vegetables, carobs (including kibbled carobs) and various minerals and of late various industrial products.

Cyprus is predominantly inhabited by Greeks, who own the greatest extent of land and bear the greater part of expenditure.

According to the last census of 1960 the population of Cyprus was 573,566, out of whom 441,656 were Greeks, I04,942 were Turks and 26,968 of other races. Thus the percentage was 77.0 % Greeks, 18.3 % Turks and 4.7 % other races.
Statistical calculations, however, made in 1975 show that the population of Cyprus has increased to 638,900 out of whom 492,000 are Greeks but the aforementioned percentages do not appear to be materially affected.
The inhabitants were, until the compulsory removal of the Turkish-Cypriots to the part occupied by the Turkish troops on the north, spread over the island intermingled in the various towns and villages and, with the exception of the purely Turkish enclaves artificially voluntarily and temporarily created after the intercommunal troubles in 1963, there were very few purely Turkish villages.
The land owing by area in 1957 (excluding Government land, roads, forests etc.), was 80.6 % by Greeks, 16.6 % by Turks and 2.8 % by others and as far as assessed value of such immovable property is concerned 86.5% by Greeks,13.1 % by Turks and 0.4% by Maronites.
The contribution to public expenditure in the form of direct taxation in respect of the year 1962 was 91.9 % by Greeks and 8.1 % by Turks.
The history of Cyprus begins with the Neolithic times going back to the 6th millennium.
There is no concrete evidence about the first settlers of the Neolithic period. One view is in favor of a distinct group not related to any neighboring region whilst another view suggests that the early settlers came from the Balkans, especially from Thessalia and Macedonia with another group from Cilicia.

It is not also clear to what extent Cyprus was connected commercially or otherwise with the culture of other neighboring countries during this period and it may be simply argued that the Neolithic culture which lasted 3,500 years was developed locally with little influence from abroad.
With the discovery of copper in Cyprus early in the third millennium B.e. the history of Cyprus enters into a new period the Bronze period 2500-1500 B.C.
During that period human settlements began to spread to the interior of the island and there was a change in the composition of the population by the arrival of foreigners from neighboring countries of Aryan race. Commercial and other relations with neighboring countries were maintained during the period.

The most important event during that period was the arrival of Achaean-Mycenaeans around the middle of the second millennium and the Achaean civilization which earlier was ftourishing in Crete now was introduced into Cyprus. The extent of the Mycenaean influence was been shown by the archaeological findings since the last century-tombs, vases and other remains as well as the recent excavation of a complete Mycenaean city in eastern Cyprus.

Before the end of the second millennium more Greek colonists arrived to live in Cyprus while others settled on the east and west of Asia Minor. Homer speaks of Cinyras, the King of Paphos, who gave Agamemnon, the Commader-in-Chief of the Greek forces against Troy, a decorated suit of armor and king Cinyras is praised by the Greek poet Tyrtaeous (seventh century s.c.) and Pindar (fifth century s.c.). Legends existed for the foundation of cities in Cyprus by the Greek heroes of the Trojan war such as Salamis by Teucer, brother of Ajax, Paphos by Agapenor from Arcadia, Idalium by Chalcanor, Lapithos by Praxandros of Laconia, Chytri (the present day Kythrea) by Chytrus, Aepeia, near Soli by Demophon and others.
The Greek colonization was very extensive and this is supported by Herodotus who says that the inhabitants of Cyprus had come from Athens, Argos, Arcadia, Salamis, etc. Even Kition, traditionally a Phoenician city, became Mycenaean. Besides the Greeks Phoenicians from Syria also came to Cyprus not earlier than 1000 s.c. and settled in the coasts particularly in Kition and Lapithos.
But as Professor Gjerstad points out, there exists a fundamental difference between the Greek and the Phoenician settlements in that the former were the result of mass migration aimed at political occupation and cultural penetration whilst the latter were of a strictly commercial character.
The Greek colonists brought with them not only the Greek civilization, culture and way of living but also the Greek political ideas and manner of administration. The Phoenicians settlers on the other hand were not numerous and their influence was negligible.
With the establishment of the Achaeans in Cyprus the composition of the population was changed and the autochthonous inhabitants, the Eteocyprians, though survived until. the Hellenistic period, especially in certain places such as Amathus, were in the minority and accepted the Greek civilization and culture.
The change in the life and character of Cypriots was rapid and was not limited to the coastal areas only but it spread to all regions of the island and the bonds with Greece were becoming closer and closer so as to be said that Cyprus became a Greek island.
A new era of wealth and prosperity began and the commercial and other relations of Cyprus with the neighboring countries were increased.
On the model of the Greek city-state and following the Mycenaean system of government many kingdoms have been established and maintained in Cyprus since the first millennium having replaced the previous system of one king reigning over the whole island. Diodoros Siceliotis, the historian, refers to nine such kingdoms in the middle of the fourth century B.C.
The Cyprus kings following the Mycenaean precedent, were at the same time high priests, judges and generals and the institution of Kingship was hereditary.
Gradually the institution of the assembly of the people, the ecclesia, was developed to which the king was referring matters of administration for consideration.
The Kings of Cyprus retained their internal autonomy during the Assyrian conquest of Cyprus about the eighth century B.C. and under the Egyptians and the Persians from the sixth century to the end of the fourth B.C. even after the heroic but unsuccessful revolt under king Onesilus in the fifth century s.c. who tried to unite the Cypriots against the Persian domination.
Next important king who united the cities of Cyprus under the leadership of Salamis was its king Evagoras the First. Evagoras carried a ten years war against the Persian yoke and during this struggle he was greatly assisted by the Athenians who made him a citizen of Athens. But when after the Treaty of Antalkidas in 368 s.c. had to carry on alone, in spite of some temporary successes such as the capture of Tyre in Phoenicia in 382 s.c., was forced to yield and acknowledged by a treaty which he signed as king to king the Great King of Persia as overlord. Evagoras is the most important statesman in the history of Cyprus who not only maintained and spread the Greek culture throughout Cyprus but transmitted it to the neighboring countries.
The kings of Cyprus retained their sovereignty over their own cities during the time of Alexander the Great. When after his death in 323 s.c. a dispute arose over, the possession of Cyprus between his successors Ptolemy and Antigonus, the kings of Cyprus were divided, some of them supporting the former whilst others were assisting the latter, but eventually Cyprus came under Ptolemy who shortly afterwards was proclaimed as king Ptolemy I.
Cyprus remained under Ptolemies for two and half centuries and during that time achieved a great degree of culture and prosperity. The cities preserved a certain degree of autonomy.
During this period the institution of the ” Koinon ” (confederations of the cities of Cyprus-us was introduced the predecessor- of the Koinon Iater developed under the Roman emperors which played an important role in the religious and political. life of the island.
Cyprus was occupied by Rome in 58 s.c., as Greece had been occupied earlier, and became part of the province of Cilicia governed by a proconsul. Among the early proconsuls was the famous orator Cicero, who showed great sympathy to the people of Cyprus. Under August Cyprus became an imperial province and then in 22 s.c. a senatorial province governed by a proconsul. Paphos constituted to be the capital of Cyprus and developed greatly as a result of its trade with neighboring countries. Cyprus under the Romans preserved its Greek character.

The introduction of Christianity to Cyprus was the most important event during the early period of the Roman rule. On his first missionary journey it 45 A.D. Paul accompanied by Barnabas, a Cypriot, and Mark landed at Salamis and preached there the new religion to the Jewish synagogue. After this they crossed Cyprus preaching the new religion and reached Paphos, the capital, where the most sensational event occurred, the conversion to Christianity of the proconsul Sergius Paulus, whereupon Saul was renamed Paul. For the first time a Roman noble occupying an important public position accepted the new religion. The spreading of Christianity, however, was not an easy task as the Greek pagans and the Jews, who had been settled since the time of Ptolemy I, were attached to their old religion. The conversion to Christianity was completed by the beginning of the fifth century through the great ecclesiastical figures of the time, St. Barnabas, Heracledius, Mnason, Lazarus, Spyridon of Tremithus, Trifillios of Ledra, Philon of Karpasia, Tychon of Amathus and Epiphanios of Constantia.

On the laying of the foundations of the Byzantine empire in 330 A.D. Cyprus became a province of the Orient under the Comes Orientis, whose seat was at Antioch. Cyprus received. special attention and protection from the emperors of Byzantium and the mother of Constantine the Great, St. Helena, visited Cyprus and established christian churches including the monastery of Stavrovouni where according to tradition she left pieces of the cross upon which Christ was crucified.

When Cyprus was politically attached to Antioch an attempt was made by its Patriarch to put the Church of Cyprus under his control but this was successfully resisted by the Cypriot bishops at the Third Oecumenical Synod at Ephesus in 431 A.D. New claims were raised later by the Church of Antioch but when Archbishop Anthemios presented Emperor Zeno (498 A.D.) with a copy of St. Matthew’s Gospel, which was found in the tomb of St. Barnabas and was believed to have been placed there by St. Mark, the Emperor, recognized the autocephaly of the Church of Cyprus and conferred on its Archbishop the imperial privileges: to hold a scepter instead of a pastoral staff, to wear a purple mantle and to sign in red ink. A final resolution settling the question of the autocephaly of the Greek -Orthodox Church of Cyprus was taken by the Quini-Sext or Trullan Oecumenical Synod at Constantinople in 692 A.D.
When Cyprus was a byzantine province, the Arabs, who had accepted the new religion of Islam, raided at intervals Cyprus from the seventh to the tenth centuries and caused great destruction.

But the Arabs never made an organized attempt to occupy Cyprus and their activities.. were limited to looting and taking prisoners.

The last episode in the history of Cyprus as a province of the Byzantine empire occurred at the time of Isaac Comnenos, who usurped by deceit the office of ruler of Cyprus (1184 A.D.). The king of England Richard Coeur de Lion was on his way to the Holy Land as one of the leaders of the Third Crusade, but his fleet was scattered by a storm and the ship carrying his fiance Berengaria and his sister Joanna, Queen of Sicily, was forced to take refuge in the bay of Limassol. Isaac tried to entice the two women to land in order to hold them for ransom but Richard arrived in time and eventually expelled Isaac Comnenos from his office.

The period of the Byzantine rule in Cyprus came thus to an end.

Throughout the Byzantine period the Greek character of Cyprus was preserved in all its manifestations.

The rule of Richard Coeur de Lion lasted very shortly. He sold Cyprus to the Order of the Knight Templars against payment of 40,000 gold besants. But the Knight Templars, facing the resistance of the Cypriots, asked Richard Coeur de Lion to return the money and take back Cyprus. Richard was too pleased to sell Cyprus to Guy de Lusignan, King of Jerusalem, for 100,000 besants thus making a profit of 60,000 besants after returning the 40,000 to the Knight Templars.

Cyprus became then a Frankish Kingdom. The Lusignans ruled Cyprus for about three hundred years (1192-1489) on the feudal system, all privileges belonging to the nobles whilst the people was oppressed without any participation in the administration of their own country. The history of Cyprus under the Lusignan rule is essentially the history of the royal court in Cyprus and not a history of the people of Cyprus.

The system of administration was foreign to the Greek population of Cyprus and all political power was vested and exercised by the ruling class of Franks.
The legislation during the Lusignan period was the one contained in the Assizes of Cyprus, written in the then spoken Cypriot language, which was based on the Assizes of Jerusalem and contained the feudal law though the influence of Byzantine and Greek law is manifest.

During the Frankish period the Greek Orthodox Church was in a state of persecution as the Latin Church was trying to subjugate it.
In the dynasty of Lusignans there were rulers such as Hugh Il I and Henry II in the thirteenth century and Hugh IV and Peter I in the fourteenth century who contributed to the stability and financial prosperity of the island. It is remarkable that Peter I foresaw the danger from the Turks and tried, though unsuccessfully, to unite the European countries against them.
The last Queen of the Lusignan dynasty Catherine Cornaro ceded Cyprus to Venice in 1489, when the Lusignan domination of Cyprus ended.
Three centuries of foreign rule failed to destroy the Greek language of the people, their religion and their cultural Greek beliefs.
The Venetian occupation of Cyprus (1489-1570) had a purely military, purpose that of defending the Venetian interests from any dangers that might come from Egypt and the Turks. All authority was now vested in the Council of Venice, who every two years were sending a Proveditor to govern the island. In governing Cyprus Venice was looking after her own interests and the well being of the inhabitants was utterly neglected.
The Turks, who had captured Constantinople in 1453, invaded Cyprus with a powerful army in 1570 and, in spite of the defense put up by the Venetians, they captured Nicosia in the same year and in 1571 Famagusta fell after an heroic resistance of the Venetian commander Marcantonio Bragadino. After the capture of Nicosia, but especially after the fall of Famagusta, unprecedented acts of atrocities followed, property was looted and most of the important Christian Churches, such as St. Sophia and St. Catherine in Nicosia and St. Nicholas in Famagusta, were converted to moslem mosques and remained as such to this date.

Hill in his History of Cyprus after referring to the capture of Nicosia, at which the massacre and looting went on for three days, writes that “the reader may be spared description of horrors which were such as usually occurred at the capture of any Christian city by the Turks” and after the fall of Famagusta observes that ” the history of Cyprus is rich in episodes of horror, and this was an age inferior to no other in barbarity: but as an example of cold-blooded ferocity, in which the childishness of the savage combines with the refinements of the sadist, the martyrdom of the hero of Famagusta by Mustafa Pasha yields the palm to none. It was inspired not by momentary fury, but by deliberate blood lust. Some details may have been exaggerated by anti-Moslem sentiment, but the main facts are not open to doubt”.

With the fall of Nicosia and Famagusta the rest of the island was occupied without opposition.

The Turkish conquest brought many radical changes to Cyprus In spite of atrocities the Turks supported the Greek-Orthodox Church, which replaced the Roman Catholic as the official Church of the island.
The Archbishop was allowed to return to his seat at Nicosia from Soli and the bishops also returned to their sees-Kyrenia, Larnaca and Paphos, from the villages to which they had been posted by the Franks. The island’s first Archbishop after the conquest was Timotheos and a synod convened by him in Cyprus declared the subjugation of the Orthodox Church to the Roman Catholic Church invalid and resolved the restoration of its bonds with the Orthodox Church at Constantinople.
The Archbishop of Cyprus was given similar privileges as those conferred on the Patriarch at Constantinople.
In Cyprus the Archbishop, to whom a Berat was issued on his election outlining his secular powers, was considered as the Head of the ” Rayas and their representative” and as such was responsible for imposing and collecting the taxes.

During the Turkish occupation a system of wide local government was existing and operating.

The Turkish rule in Cyprus ended in 1878.

By the Convention of defensive alliance between Great Britain and Turkey with respect to the Asiatic provinces of Turkey signed at Constantinople on the 4th June 1878, Turkey consented “to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England ” for enabling her to make the necessary provision for executing her engagements under the Treaty. By an Annex to this Convention signed at Constantinople of the l st July 1878 between the same Contracting Parties the conditions under which England would occupy Cyprus are provided and a provision was made that ” if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the Island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England and the Convention of the 4th June 1878 will be at an end “.
By an additional Article signed at Constantinople on tho l4th August 1878, it was agreed between the High Contracting Parties that for the term of the occupation and no longer, full powers were granted to the Great Britain for making Laws and Conventions for the Government of the Island and for the regulating of its Commercial and consular relations and affairs.

In July 1878 Cyprus was occupied by Great Britain.

During all the years of foreign occupation many conquerors passed through Cyprus and she came across many civilizations. Though they left their traces, which may be witnessed by the various silent monuments, nevertheless Cyprus never has lost its own character. As the modern Greek poet says: “You have changed many despots but you have never changed your heart”.
Stanley Casson rightly observes that ” there is always perceptible an undercurrent of influence which, for good or bad, remains Cypriot. Nothing that Cyprus adopted remained unaffected. Instead it will be incorrect to say that Cyprus “has absorbed anything, she rather absorbed and then transformed”.

1. The right of petitioning the authorities took its rise in constitutional law from the Magna Carta (1215). Ever since the right of petitioning the Crown and Parliament for redress of grievances has been acknowledged as a fundamental principle of the English constitutional law and has been uninterruptedly exercised.

When an aggrieved party could not obtain a write to suit his case he would often adopt the expedient of presenting a petition to the King in Council, concisely stating the facts of his case and the relief sought. Such petitions were delegated by the Council to one or more of its members, usually the Chancellor, but in cases relating to admiralty to the Admiral, for consideration and decision. By the middle and later fourteenth century, however, a variety of addresses occur on those petitions. Sometimes this were sent to the King, sometimes to the Council and more often to the Chancellor. In this way the chancery jurisdiction originated. As a result of the Seven Bishops Trials the right to petition has been recognized by an express provision in the Bill of Rights, 1668, to the effect that

“It is the right of the subjects to petition the King and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitions are illegal”.

Petitions were also submitted to the King in Parliament as the highest court of justice. They were originally directed to judicial rather than legislative measures, and they were dealing with individual grievances. Gradually, however, and especially during the seventeenth century when Parliament came to be regarded as a political and legislative body rather that as a court, the petitions were addressed to either of the House and were praying usually for an alteration of the general law rather than a redress of private wrong.
The right to petition the House of Commons and its powers in this respect there were laid down in the following two resolutions of the House of Commons in 1699:

“That it is the inherent right of every commoner in England to prepare and present petitions to the House of Commons in case of grievance, and the House of Commons to receive the same”.
“That it is an undoubted right and privilege of the Commons to judge and determine, touching the nature and matter of such petitions, how far they are lit and unfit to be received”.

Under the prevailing practice such petitions are presented to the Houses of Parliament by one of their members but they may be sent directly by British subjects residing abroad or by inhabitants of overseas British territories. Of course their receivability depends upon the competence of Parliament to deal with them.
Petitions to the Crown continue to be submitted in exercise of the constitutional right comprised in the aforesaid provision of the Bill of Rights.

2. The right to petition is guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Under that Amendment.
“Congress shall make no law … abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances”.
Though historically the right to petition in the primary right and the right to peaceably assemble a subordinate and instrumental right as if the First Amendment was reading “the right of the people peaceably to assemble in order to petition government”, nevertheless, the modern view is that the right to peaceably assemble is “a cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental”. Furthermore the right to petition has expanded as it was found not to be confined to “redress of grievances” but to comprehend demands for any exercise by the government of its powers in furtherance of the interest and prosperity of the petitioners and of their views an politically contentious matters. As observed by Chief Justice Waite in the Cruikshank’s case.

“The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning the Congress for a redress of grievances or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is an attribute of national citizenship and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in from, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect of public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances”.

In this way the sending of a telegram to the Secretary of State for Labour sharply criticizing the action of a State court in a pending case was considered an exercise of the right to petition a duly accredited representative of the United States.
Also the right of lobbying in its commonly accepted sense of directing communications with members of Congress on pending or intended federal legislation is considered as an expression of the right to petition.
The right to petition cannot be amended either by a State or by a private individual.

3. The right to petition in France has become today an historical memory. The development of the press and the freedom of assembly and association, the emergence of various political parties and other pressure groups and the expansion of their influence on the formation of public opinion and the outlining of parliamentary policies and the recourse to administrative tribunals contributed to the loss of the former importance of that right.
In the past, however, and especially towards the end of the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century the right to petition has played an important role in the constitutional history of France. The Declaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen contains no provision relating to that right.

But in the Constituent Assembly of 1791 the question of the protection of that right was raised and hotly discussed.
Chapelier, in his report to the Assembly on the 3rd May 1791 drew for the first time the distinction between the right to submit a petition for the redress of a private wrong suffered by an individual – plainte, which belongs to every person, and the right to a petition whereby a legislative reform or the adoption of certain administrative arrangements are claimed which may be exercised by an active citizen only.

“Le droit de petition” said “est le droit qu’a le citoyen actif de presenter son voeu au legislatif, au roi, aux administrateurs sur les objects d’administration et l’organization. La plainte est un droit de recours de tout homme qui serait lese dans ses interets perticuliers par une activite quelconque”.

That distinction however, was bly opposed in the Constituent Assembly of 1791 where the view that the right to petition is “la droit imprescriptible de tout homme vivant en societe” was successfully supported and was adopted by the constitution of the 3 September 1791.

Paragraph 2 of its First Title – guarantees as natural and civil right.
“La liberte d’adresser aux autorites constituees des petitions signees individuellement”.
Ever since and until 1848 that right has been considered in France as an individual right exercisable by any person. It had particular importance under the Charter of 1814 where the Houses had no right to initiate legislation as it brought them legislative matters for discussion.
Later on, however, petitions to the legislature for legislative reform were nor allowed and individual complaints could be put through a deputy.
The right to petition the legislative bodies for legislative reform though akin to the right of initiating legislation by popular initiative – initiative popular – which exists in certain countries governed under the semi-direct and semi-representative from of government, nevertheless, it is distinguished from such right.

4. The right to petition was adopted in one from or another by the various constitutions of the nineteenth century.
The Greek Constitutions during the struggle for independence contain provisions relating to the right to petition.
The Constitution revised by the National Assembly at Astros of 1823 in its article (a) provides that “each one may petition in writing the legislature setting out his opinion on any matter”.
Similar provision is contained in art. 25 of the Constitution passed by the National Assembly at Troijine in 1827, except that the opinion should be referred to public matters.

One of the oldest constitutions that of Belgium in article 21 provides that “Everyone has the right to submit to the public authorities petitions signed by one more persons.
Constituted authorities only have the right to submit petitions in a collective name”.
But that provision lost its importance in view of the increased freedom of the press.
The provision of the Constitution of Belgium was adopted in other constitutions of the nineteenth century.
Thus the Constitutions of Greece of 1844 and 1864 in their articles 7 and 9 respectively provide “that every one or many acting together may submit written petitions to the authorities observing the laws of the State”.
The Constitutions Of the Netherlands of 1887 by its article 8 not only guarantees the right to petition but prescribes also the procedure to be followed by the petitioner in the submission of his petition. Further provisions are contained in Constitutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe, Asia and Latin America.

No provision about this right has been made in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and its Protocols of the Council of Europe, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Right and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United nations.
Article 25 of the European Convention and the Optical Protocol to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, provide, however, for individual petitions from State that have declared that they accept the competence of the respective commission or committee. The Republic of Cyprus has nor yet made any declaration under article 25 of the European Convention and though she signed the Optional Protocol has not vet ratified it.
With the emergence of new institutions, such as that of the Ombudsman in various countries the right to petition lost further from its significance.

THE RIGHT TO PETITION UNDER THE LAW OF CYPRUS

1. Under Article 29 of the Constitution of the Republic
“A. Every person has the right individually or jointly with others to address written requests or complaints to any competent public authority and to have them attended to and decided expeditiously; an immediate notice of any decision taken duly reasoned shall be given to the person making the request or complaint and in any event whiten a period not exceeding thirty days.

2. Where any interested person is aggrieved by any such decision or where no such decision is notified to such person within the period specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, such person may have recourse to a competent court in the matter of such request or complaint”.
That article is not suspended on a declaration of emergency under article 183 of the Constitution and should be read in conjunction with article 35 under which the legislative, executive and judicial authorities of the Republic shall be bound to secure, within the limits of their respective competence, its efficient application. 2. The right to petition under the Constitution of Cyprus is a fundamental right having the negative features of individual rights of the old catalogue in that the State cannot interfere within the sphere of the exercise of that right. But apart from the obligation of the State to abstain (nec facere) a positive duty is imposed on it to ensure and protect that right (cf. art. 29, 1 & 2 and 35).
Article 29 creates an independent individual right which is one of fundamental human freedoms and does not only afford the means for the protection and enforcement of other human right and liberties as it has been maintained elsewhere.
Unlike other Constitutions guaranteeing that right only to citizen article 29 of the Constitution of Cyprus guarantees that right to every person. The right to petition belongs to any person in the Republic irrespective of whether such person is a citizen, an alien, a convict or is deprived of his political rights.

The question is whether legal persons can invoke the provisions of article 29. The word “person” is defined in article 186 (1) as including “any company, partnership, association, society, institution or body of persons, corporate or un incorporate”. But that definition applies “unless it is otherwise expressly provided or required by the context” and it could be argued that the word “individually” shows the opposite direction. But article 29 provides that “every person individually or jointly with others” may petition which indicates that there may be collective petitions. petitions on behalf of corporate bodies are not, therefore excluded.
The question whether public officers enjoy the protection of article 29, which is a controversial one in other countries, cannot be raised as the wording of article 29 covers every one.

3. From the wording of article 29 speaking about “requests and complaints” to “competent authorities” which have “to attend to such requests and complaints and decide thereupon expeditiously” it appears that petition to the House of representative for legislative reform or other legislative action cannot be submitted or entertained. In this respect the provision of article 29 is more restrictive than that of its prototype article 9 of the Constitution of Greece which applies not only to complaints but also to petitions suggesting to the adoption of measures not only concerning the individual petitioner but also relating to the general interests of the people or of the State.

The petition should be addressed to “any competent public authority” and not to public officers. Which are such authorities it may be inferred from the wording of paragraph 1 of article 29 and from its paragraph 2.
The “competent public authority” must be such as to be able to decide on the request or complaint made and to grand a remedy thereon and in case of its failure to be proceeded against by a recourse to the Court (paragraph 2). As decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court in the case of Kyriakides v. the Public (1 RSCC at p. 77).

“In the opinion of the Court paragraph 2 of Article 29 gives, inter alia, an aggrieved person a right of recourse to a competent court in respect of the failure to furnish him with a reply in accordance with paragraph 1 of such Article. It is clear that, where the competent public authority, which has failed to reply as above, is one of those referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 146, then this Court is the competent court in question and proceedings lie before it under Article 146 in respect of such failure itself to reply”.
The public authorities referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 146 are “authorities exercising any executive or administrative authority”.

A petition cannot be made to the House of Representative which in not an authority but an organ of the State exercising the legislative power (article 61) or to the Court which are the organs of the State exercising the judicial power (articles 133 and 152). A petition to an authority exercising juridical or quassi juridical functions in respect of such exercise cannot be made either.

A petition under article 29 does not lie respect of any act which is not considered as involving “the exercise of executive or administrative authority”. Thus the exercise of the prerogative of mercy though considered an exercise of “executive power” under articles 47 (i), 48 (m) and 49 (m) of the Constitution does not ipso facto amount to exercise of “any executive or administrative authority” within the meaning of article 146.1 and therefore, petitions for mercy are not within the ambit of article 29. 4. On the submission of a petition complying with article 29 to a competent authority, that is to say to the authority which has competence to deal with the petition and pronounce a decision thereon that authority has a constitutional duty to attend to the decision and decide thereon expeditiously. On reaching a decision notice of the decision, duly reasoned should be given to the petitioner promptly and in any event within a period not exceeding thirty days.

The decision contemplated by article 29 must be interpreted as being a decision which is capable of being reached, having regard to the circumstances of each particular case, within the period of thirty days.
If the interested person is aggrieved by any such decision or where no such decision is notified to such person within the thirty days, such person may have recourse to a competent court in the matter of such request or complaint.
So long as the decision should be duly reasoned it follows that the Supreme Court to have competence to deal with a failure to comply with article 29 the subject matter of the request or complaint must be within the jurisdiction of the Court under article 146 otherwise the Court could not properly examine the matter and decide whether the reply was duly reasoned or not. A request or complaint relating to a legislative or juridical act, not coming within the purview of article 146, connate therefore, be the subject of a request or complaint under article 29.
And if the petitioner, who has not received a reply to his petition, has proceeded under article 146 in respect of the substance of the matter for which a reply has been sought then it cannon be said that such person continues any longer to have “any existing legitimate interest”, as provided by paragraph 2 of article 146, unless as a result of such failure itself he has suffered any material, determent which would entitle to a claim for relief under paragraph 6 of article 146. The petitioner cannot, therefore, claim a decision for failure to reply under article 29 when he has proceeded in respect of the substance of the matter for which a reply has been sought.

5. In the Constitution of Cyprus there is no provision expressly restraining any juridical proceedings against the petitioner for any matter contained in the petition pending its consideration and final disposal, as it exists in the Constitution of Greece.
That provision was for the first time made in Greece during the revision of its Constitution in 1911 and according to the report of the then constitutional committee “it was made to remedy a non rarely occurring impropriety whereby a petitioner before been heard was transformed into an accused owing to an alleged libel or other offence contained in the petition”.
In Cyprus no such case has occurred so far. But it would be improper to prosecute a petitioner for allegations contained in his petition, which may render him liable to prosecution, before the disposal of the petition itself. The Attorney-General, who under article 113 is in change of all prosecutions, no doubt shall not embark upon or shall stay any such prosecution.
Some considerations apply in case of disciplinary proceedings. So long as the matter is under examination it would be improper to start disciplinary proceedings for alleged disciplinary offences contained in the petition.
Of course the petitioner shall remain civilly or criminally liable for the contents of his petition though in case of defamation it may be a good defense that the publication was conditionally privileged.

6. The right to petition in Cyprus, being restricted to petitions for redress for a private wrong – droit de plainte – and not extended on the whole ground covered by such right elsewhere, is of greater importance than in order countries. And though the individual has got also a right of recourse to the Court against acts or omissions of authorities exercising executive or administrative authority which are contrary to law or in excess of power, nevertheless such recourse does not detract from the importance of the right to petition which may provide a quicker and simpler course for redress. The right to petition is exercised under the supervision and the protection of the Courts, which have been always prompt to intervene in any case of infringement of such right for safeguarding the interests of the individual.
In the absence of an Ombudsman in Cyprus the existence of the right to petition may constitute, to certain extent, a substitute for his functions.

Criton G. TORNARITIS,
Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus
RESUME

I. Le droit de petition a penetre dans le droit constitutionnel anglais par la Magna Carta de 1215. Depuis Iors il a ete sans interruption donnant meme naissance a la competence juridictionnelle du Chancelier. Au depart, les petitions visaient des measures judiciaires plutot que legislatives et exposaient des griefs individules. Mais progresivement la petition a l’organe legislatif est apparue, surtout a partir du 17e siecle.
Aux Etats-Unis, le droit de petition est granti par le Premier Amendement a la Constitution. Il est interprete aujourd’hui comme comprenant non seulement la plainte personnelle mais aussi la demande adressee a l’executif et au legislatif pour qu’ils exercent leurs pouvoirs dans un certain sens.
En France, le droit de petition appartient pour l’essentiel a l’histoire par suite, notamment, du developpment de la presse et des possibilites de recours qu’offrent les tribunaux administratifs.
Le droit de petition a ete adopte, sous une forme ou une autre, par les diverses Vonstitutions du XIXe siecle et en particulier, par les Constitutions grecque, belge et neerlandaise. Aucune disposition concernant le droit de petition ne figure cependant ni dans la Declaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme et dans les Pactes ni dans la Convention Europeenne et ses Protocoles Additionnels. L’apparition de nouvelles institutions, comme celle de l’Ombudsman, a d’ailleurs enleve beaucoup de signification au droit de petition.

II. Dans la Constitution de la Republique de Chypre, c’est l’article 29 qui garantit a toute personne (et pas seulement a tout citoyen) le droit d’adresser des demandes ou des plaintes ecrites a toute autorite publique competente. Ainsi, un droit individuel autonome est cree qui permet de proteger les autres droits de l’homme, surtout qu’il ne peut faire l’object d’aucune mesure de derogation, meme pendant les periodes d’exception. Son application, cependant, a souleve un certain nombre de problemes.
C’est qu’il est admis le droit de petition peut exerce par toute personne aussi bien physique que morale. Les fonctionnaires n’en sont pas davantage prives. Il s’adresse a toute autorite publique, executive ou administrative, a l’exclusion donc du Parlement qui est un organe de l’Etat execat le pouvoir legislatif et des tribunaux qui exercent le pouvoir judiciare.
L’autorite saisi de la petition doit se prononcer rapidement par une decisionmotivee qui doit etre a la connaissance du petitionnaire dans un delai n’excedant pas trente jours. Si tel n’est pas le cas petitionnaire peut saisir les tribunaux.
Aucune disposition de la Constitution chypriote ne limite expressement la possibilite d’engager une action en justice contre le petitionnaire aussi longtemps qu’une decision au sujet de sa petition n’aura pas ete prise. Cette limitation n’en existe pas moins en fait mais, bien entendu, elle n’est que temporaire.
Le droit de petition qui est donc a Chypre un droit de plainte y joue un role beaucoup plus important que dans d’autres pays. Exerce sous la protection et le controle des tribunaux, il fournit une voie de recours plus simple et plus rapide, remplacant, dans une certaine mesure, l’institution d’un Ombudsman.