The petition should be addressed to “any competent public authority” and not to public officers. Which are such authorities it may be inferred from the wording of paragraph 1 of article 29 and from its paragraph 2.
The “competent public authority” must be such as to be able to decide on the request or complaint made and to grand a remedy thereon and in case of its failure to be proceeded against by a recourse to the Court (paragraph 2). As decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court in the case of Kyriakides v. the Public (1 RSCC at p. 77).

“In the opinion of the Court paragraph 2 of Article 29 gives, inter alia, an aggrieved person a right of recourse to a competent court in respect of the failure to furnish him with a reply in accordance with paragraph 1 of such Article. It is clear that, where the competent public authority, which has failed to reply as above, is one of those referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 146, then this Court is the competent court in question and proceedings lie before it under Article 146 in respect of such failure itself to reply”.
The public authorities referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 146 are “authorities exercising any executive or administrative authority”.

A petition cannot be made to the House of Representative which in not an authority but an organ of the State exercising the legislative power (article 61) or to the Court which are the organs of the State exercising the judicial power (articles 133 and 152). A petition to an authority exercising juridical or quassi juridical functions in respect of such exercise cannot be made either.

A petition under article 29 does not lie respect of any act which is not considered as involving “the exercise of executive or administrative authority”. Thus the exercise of the prerogative of mercy though considered an exercise of “executive power” under articles 47 (i), 48 (m) and 49 (m) of the Constitution does not ipso facto amount to exercise of “any executive or administrative authority” within the meaning of article 146.1 and therefore, petitions for mercy are not within the ambit of article 29. 4. On the submission of a petition complying with article 29 to a competent authority, that is to say to the authority which has competence to deal with the petition and pronounce a decision thereon that authority has a constitutional duty to attend to the decision and decide thereon expeditiously. On reaching a decision notice of the decision, duly reasoned should be given to the petitioner promptly and in any event within a period not exceeding thirty days.

The decision contemplated by article 29 must be interpreted as being a decision which is capable of being reached, having regard to the circumstances of each particular case, within the period of thirty days.
If the interested person is aggrieved by any such decision or where no such decision is notified to such person within the thirty days, such person may have recourse to a competent court in the matter of such request or complaint.
So long as the decision should be duly reasoned it follows that the Supreme Court to have competence to deal with a failure to comply with article 29 the subject matter of the request or complaint must be within the jurisdiction of the Court under article 146 otherwise the Court could not properly examine the matter and decide whether the reply was duly reasoned or not. A request or complaint relating to a legislative or juridical act, not coming within the purview of article 146, connate therefore, be the subject of a request or complaint under article 29.
And if the petitioner, who has not received a reply to his petition, has proceeded under article 146 in respect of the substance of the matter for which a reply has been sought then it cannon be said that such person continues any longer to have “any existing legitimate interest”, as provided by paragraph 2 of article 146, unless as a result of such failure itself he has suffered any material, determent which would entitle to a claim for relief under paragraph 6 of article 146. The petitioner cannot, therefore, claim a decision for failure to reply under article 29 when he has proceeded in respect of the substance of the matter for which a reply has been sought.

5. In the Constitution of Cyprus there is no provision expressly restraining any juridical proceedings against the petitioner for any matter contained in the petition pending its consideration and final disposal, as it exists in the Constitution of Greece.
That provision was for the first time made in Greece during the revision of its Constitution in 1911 and according to the report of the then constitutional committee “it was made to remedy a non rarely occurring impropriety whereby a petitioner before been heard was transformed into an accused owing to an alleged libel or other offence contained in the petition”.
In Cyprus no such case has occurred so far. But it would be improper to prosecute a petitioner for allegations contained in his petition, which may render him liable to prosecution, before the disposal of the petition itself. The Attorney-General, who under article 113 is in change of all prosecutions, no doubt shall not embark upon or shall stay any such prosecution.
Some considerations apply in case of disciplinary proceedings. So long as the matter is under examination it would be improper to start disciplinary proceedings for alleged disciplinary offences contained in the petition.
Of course the petitioner shall remain civilly or criminally liable for the contents of his petition though in case of defamation it may be a good defense that the publication was conditionally privileged.

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